The Politics of Trauma System Development by Hackey, Robert B.
Providence College
DigitalCommons@Providence
Health Policy and Management Faculty
Publications Health Policy and Management
12-1-1995
The Politics of Trauma System Development
Robert B. Hackey
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.providence.edu/health_policy_fac
Part of the Health Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Health Policy and Management at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Health Policy and Management Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Providence. For more
information, please contact mcaprio1@providence.edu.
Hackey, Robert B., "The Politics of Trauma System Development" (1995). Health Policy and Management Faculty Publications. Paper 8.
http://digitalcommons.providence.edu/health_policy_fac/8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Politics of Trauma System Development* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert B. Hackey, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 
North Dartmouth, MA 02747 
(508) 999-8996 
FAX (508) 999-8374 
Email RHACKEY @ UMASSD.EDU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political 
Science Association held in Providence, R.I., November 10-12, 1994. I am indebted to Bill Waters and 
Don Williams of the Rhode Island Department of Health and Gary Zajac of the University of Pittsburgh 
for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. 
 
 Abstract 
 
 Federal and state policy makers have turned to health planning programs as a means to 
rationalize the delivery of health care services in the United States for over three decades. Early federal 
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 and the Health Planning and 
Resource Development Act of 1974 were widely criticized for their inability to control costs effectively 
or to increase the efficiency of health services delivery.   The design and implementation of the federal 
government's latest entry into health planning, the Trauma Care System Planning and Development Act 
of 1990 (Pub.L. 101-590), suggests that federal and state officials are poised to repeat the mistakes which 
plagued previous planning programs.  The implementation of Pub. L. 101-590 illustrates the dilemmas 
that federal and state officials must confront in achieving effective representation and assuring active 
participation in the planning process.  Successful regional and statewide planning ventures must devise 
strategies to overcome the inherent collective action problems associated with cooperative solutions to 
underserved populations. Contemporary approaches to health planning, however, are based upon a 
number of questionable assumptions.  The creation of new institutional structures merely shifts the venue 
for existing conflicts among health providers, third party insurers, and other participants in the health 
policy making process to a new arena. In addition to examining possible alternatives for improving 
current trauma system planning initiatives, I present a new paradigm for designing and implementing 
state and federal planning programs. 
 
 
 
 3 
 The demise of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (Pub. L. 93-641) in 
1986 signalled the end of two decades of federal involvement in state and local health planning. Within 
five years, however, the federal government was back in the planning business, albeit on a smaller scale, 
with the passage of the Trauma Care System Planning and Development Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-590). 
While health planning--either as a voluntary or a mandatory process--has a powerful appeal to federal 
and state policy makers seeking to control the rising cost of health care and improve the quality of 
services offered by health providers, the federal government's latest venture into health planning 
threatens to repeat the mistakes of the past.  In contrast to more intrusive forms of regulation, planning 
programs promise to rationalize the delivery of health care services by forging consensus among 
providers, payers, and public representatives over the appropriate goals for the health care system.  
However, unless federal and state policy makers are able to grapple with the inherent contradictions 
sown within Pub. L. 101-590, the prospects for successfully implementing federal health planning 
programs appear no brighter today than in the 1970s. 
 Because state trauma system planning programs seek to address a number of shortcomings in the 
present U. S. health care delivery system, they offer an instructive case study of the prospects for 
effective state level health care reform. Trauma system planners have adopted an "inclusive" approach to 
improving the quality of care provided to injured patients by developing strategies for overcoming 
problems of access, cost, and variations in the quality of services.  Trauma system planning raises 
fundamental questions of access, particularly for patients without health insurance or for those who live 
in rural areas far from the nearest hospital. Furthermore, since trauma centers must provide treatment to 
all injured patients brought through their doors, they have become a focal point for current concerns 
about caring for the uninsured, for trauma patients are more likely to lack health insurance coverage 
(particularly in urban areas) than non-trauma admissions.  Finally, since not all hospitals are equipped to 
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care for severely injured patients, trauma system planning has emphasized the benefits of regionalization; 
by transporting injured patients to those facilities best equipped to care for them, it is argued, 
regionalization can improve both the quality of care and control health care costs by eliminating the need 
for expensive services and facilities at hospitals which are not participating trauma centers.  Since the 
issues involved in trauma system planning raise a number of financing and organizational questions, the 
success or failure of these planning efforts can tell us a great deal about the ability of states to tackle 
health care reform.  If states cannot implement reform in a narrowly defined arena where clear national 
standards are present, how likely are they to serve as engines of more comprehensive reform? 
Health Planning as a Political Problem 
  The popularity of planning programs as the solution to the dilemmas of cost, quality, and access 
stems from a belief that although the U.S. health care system remains fundamentally sound, inefficiencies 
in the organization and financing of care could be improved through careful application of rational 
planning and technical expertise.  State and federal planning legislation in the 1960s and 1970s reflected 
policy makers' belief that careful study of relevant data and broad participation from the community 
would identify inefficiencies in the delivery of health care.  Furthermore, the development of 
comprehensive state and local plans would provide rational alternatives for changing the behavior of 
health providers and reorganizing the delivery of health services to control costs, improve the quality of 
services, and improve access to care for underserved groups.
1
  Health planning programs also presented 
policy makers with an opportunity to address growing concerns about the U.S. health care system without 
significantly interfering in the practice of medicine, for early federal initiatives "sought to organize away 
profound American dilemmas without the use of systematic state power."
2
  
 By the early 1970s there was a widespread recognition that neither doctors, hospitals, nor 
patients had an incentive to restrict utilization of hospital services as long as health providers were 
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reimbursed in full for the cost of patient care on a fee for service basis.  Doctors and hospitals could, in 
essence, increase the demand for hospital services by their choice of treatments or diagnostic 
procedures.
3
  Patients, for their part, were insulated from the true cost of their treatment by extensive 
hospital insurance coverage.
4
  Beginning in the late 1960s, states responded to rising utilization and 
health care costs with programs designed to restrict the growth of hospital facilities, in the expectation 
that "a bed not built is a bed not used."
5
  
 Government regulation of the hospital industry increased markedly during the 1970s after the 
passage of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-641) established 
more than 200 federally funded local health planning agencies. While physicians and hospital 
administrators may have been unaccustomed to dealing with federal and state governments on such 
matters, health planners were primarily thorns in providers' sides whose actions did not threaten 
hospitals' long-term financial health or profitability.  The most critical decisions which affected the level 
of reimbursement for hospital services remained beyond the scope of planners' jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
"physicians, and more relevantly, hospital administrators, quickly discovered that the planning system 
could be outmaneuvered.  The system was not much of an obstacle once the consultants were called in to 
advise."
6
 
 The new planning agencies were unpopular with providers and ineffective at controlling costs, 
for planners lacked the authority to impose effective sanctions upon hospitals.
7
  Even their supporters 
acknowledged that the new agencies were beset by multiple (and often conflicting) goals, lacked the 
requisite authority to pursue these goals, and offered budding planners few incentives to engage in trench 
warfare with local hospitals.
8
 Proponents of planning expected the development of state and local 
planning documents to build a consensus for change based upon technical expertise and grassroots 
participation.  In practice, however, health planning bore little resemblance to a rational approach to 
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resource allocation, as interested parties clamored for seats on state and local advisory boards to protect 
their own interests.  Consensus proved to be an elusive, if not impossible goal. 
 Much of the controversy surrounding the federal health planning initiatives of the 1970s 
stemmed from heated debates over who would sit on the advisory boards of the new planning agencies.  
In the end, the process of planning took a back seat to conflicts over representation, for the 1974 enabling 
legislation mandated that  a majority of each state or regional planning body be comprised of  
"consumers" (e.g., nonproviders).  Agencies were required to assemble boards who were broadly 
representative of the "social, economic, linguistic, and racial populations, geographic areas of the health 
service area, and major purchasers of health care" in the surrounding community.  In state after state, 
disaffected participants, or those who felt under-represented, claimed that the selection process was 
unfair and fought for seats on state and local boards in the courts.
9
  
 During the 1980s, health planning fell victim to a changing ideological climate that favored 
competitive rather than regulatory solutions. The Reagan administration's hostility towards health 
planning led to the demise of the federally funded state planning infrastructure after the expiration of 
Pub. L. 93-641 in 1986.
10
  In addition, twelve states repealed existing certificate of need programs 
established during the 1970s to review health providers' proposed capital expenditures.  By the end of the 
decade, however, health planning had returned to the federal policy agenda as surgeons, emergency 
physicians, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and other allied health providers pressed for 
Congressional action to reduce the number of deaths from unintentional injuries in the United States.  
The result was ironic--after more than a decade of chafing under the restrictions imposed by federally 
funded health systems planning, many health providers (particularly surgeons and administrators of 
urban trauma centers)now clamored for a new federal planning initiative to rationalize the delivery of 
health care services for critically injured patients. 
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The Origins and Goals of Trauma System Planning 
 Advocates for trauma system development and injury prevention programs welcomed federal 
intervention despite the shortcomings of federally sponsored health planning initiatives in the 1970s. 
Injury was the nation's third leading cause of death during the 1980s, claiming more than 140,000 lives 
each year, and injuries were the leading cause of death among persons aged 1-44.
11
  While injuries have 
long been regarded as "accidents," new studies in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that many injury-related 
deaths could be prevented by developing an organized and rational approach for treating injured 
patients.
12
  Contemporary trauma care systems trace their origins to new techniques for caring for injured 
soldiers on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam.  Rapid access to definitive surgical care at mobile 
army surgical hospital (MASH) units and the refinement of prehospital care techniques significantly 
reduced U.S. military casualties in both wars.  This experience led to calls for the development of similar 
organized systems to care for treating patients in the U.S., where injury had been dubbed the "neglected 
disease of modern society" by the National Academy of Sciences in the 1960s.
13
  By the 1970s, many in 
the medical community believed that the lessons learned on the battlefield about the effectiveness of 
triage, rapid transport of injured patients, and the standardization of lifesaving techniques for use by 
medical personnel in remote areas could be applied to the treatment of persons injured in motor vehicle 
collisions, falls, and other unintentional injuries in the U.S. Although the passage of highway safety 
legislation by Congress provided an impetus for many communities to improve the quality of local 
emergency medical care and trauma services, the development of local trauma systems varied greatly 
within states and communities. 
 Trauma centers proliferated during the 1970s, as many hospitals regarded trauma patients as a 
source of both profitable patients and institutional prestige. Under the prevailing method of retrospective, 
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cost-based reimbursement, health providers had an incentive to treat more "expensive" and difficult 
cases, for their costs would be fully reimbursed by third-party insurers.  Since hospitals compete on the 
basis of perceived quality and reputation, rather than price, the development of a trauma center was often 
regarded as a means to improve the hospital's image in the community and attract patients. In addition to 
the obvious revenue incentives for treating trauma patients, emergency physicians and surgeons at many 
teaching hospitals also had a strong professional interest in developing trauma centers, for a greater 
volume of patients would provide opportunities for improving their skills and conducting research. 
Hospital administrators, for their part, were willing to accommodate the desires of their medical staffs, 
for "the group of attending physicians on the hospital's staff enjoys de facto control of the hospital at any 
point in time" as a result of their monopoly over patient referrals.
2
 
 By the early 1980s, however, spiralling Medicare and Medicaid costs led to the first significant 
change in hospital reimbursement since 1965. Beginning in 1982, for the first time, a significant fraction 
of hospitals' revenues were determined on a prospective, rather than a retrospective basis. Under the new 
system, federal bureaucrats, not hospital administrators, set reimbursement rates for all inpatient hospital 
services, minimizing haggling over "allowable costs." A year later, Congress adopted a new case-based 
prospective payment system (PPS)  for Medicare amid little debate after a brief four month gestation 
period. Within five years, Medicare's new PPS turned the long-established relationships among 
providers, payers, and the public upside down. While generous reimbursement rates in the first three 
years of PPS led to record profits in the hospital industry, as institutions' operating margin for Medicare 
patients exceeded 10 percent from 1984-86, by the late 1980s adjustments to PPS rates lagged well 
behind the overall rate of medical inflation.
14
 
15
  PPS offered federal officials a powerful weapon to 
influence providers' behavior.  Since Medicare patients represented the largest component of most 
hospitals' charges, institutions were forced to modify their behavior to cope with lower rates of 
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reimbursement.
16
  Medicare reaped considerable savings under the new system as hospitals changed their 
behavior to conform to the incentives of a case-based reimbursement system:  admissions declined, as did 
patients average length of stay.   
 The changes in Medicare's reimbursement formula had a powerful impact on hospital trauma 
centers. Under PPS, payments for inpatient hospital care was based on the average cost of a procedure 
among a peer group of hospitals. PPS was designed to promote the efficient use of resources by hospitals, 
for if an institution's costs for treating a case were below the peer group average, it kept the difference as 
profit. Institutions whose costs exceeded the average price per case, however, were not compensated for 
their losses. To complicate matters further, Medicare's new payment system did not adjust reimbursement 
rates adequately to account for differences in the severity of patients' injuries.
17
 
18
 
19
  These changes were 
particularly difficult for hospitals with a large caseload of trauma patients, for the cost of treating 
severely injured patients is often two to four times the average cost of non-trauma admissions as a result 
of longer lengths of stay and more frequent use of intensive care units.
20
 At the same time, hospitals in 
many cities saw a dramatic increase in trauma cases as a result of a growing wave of drug related 
violence. Combined with the high costs of 24 hour staffing and equipment requirements, inadequate 
reimbursement and a growing number of uninsured patients led to significant financial losses for many 
trauma centers. As a result, more than 10% of the trauma centers in the US  closed between 1983 and 
1992, while others continued to pile up red ink.
21
 
 Growing concern about the fiscal health of the nation's trauma centers in the late 1980s, coupled 
with increased awareness of the importance of injury control after the publication of a second report on 
injury by the National Academy of Sciences, led to renewed Congressional interest in improving the 
nation's emergency medical services and trauma care system. Congressional hearings on the Trauma Care 
Systems Planning and Development Act (S. 15) in 1989 and 1990 attracted strong support from a host of 
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health providers, including representatives from the American College of Surgeons (ACS), the American 
College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), and various organizations representing emergency nurses and 
allied health professionals. The testimony of surgeons and ER physicians before Congress underscored a 
common theme:  more than a decade of statistical evidence from across the nation suggested that many 
injury related deaths were preventable.
22
  By directing patients to facilities which met well defined 
minimum standards established by the ACS and other national organizations, regional trauma systems 
saved lives and improved the quality of care for injured patients.  
 Since well defined standards of care already existed for trauma patients, the challenge for states 
was to coordinate the activities of different groups of providers to create a seamless system of care.  
Federal intervention, these providers argued, would help states to develop plans which applied the 
lessons learned from existing trauma systems in San Francisco, Orange County, and elsewhere.  From 
trauma providers' perspective, a new federal planning program would contribute essential seed money to 
conduct needs assessments, bring relevant parties together, and create an institutional mechanism to 
coordinate care among prehospital providers such as EMTs and air ambulance services, clinics and other 
hospitals which lacked the facilities or personnel to treat trauma patients, and specialized trauma centers. 
The legislation met the approval of a joint House-Senate conference committee in October 1990. 
 The passage of Pub. L. 101-590 raised expectations among trauma care providers that federal 
intervention would significantly improve the quality of services for injured patients by enabling states to 
inventory their patient care resources, assess unmet needs, and develop plans to coordinate services. A 
national trauma care advisory council was created to develop a model trauma care system plan which 
would outline the crucial elements of an "inclusive" trauma care system within one year. The inclusive 
approach to trauma system development embodied in the 1990 legislation reflected a growing consensus 
that the planning process should address several distinct, yet related goals, including (1) public 
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education, data collection and evaluation, and injury prevention programs to reduce the incidence of 
injury, (2) improved access to care through the development of effective prehospital communications and 
emergency 9-1-1 systems; (3) proper training and triage protocols for prehospital personnel; (4) standards 
for the designation and classification of health care facilities; (5) the creation of evaluation procedures 
and data to monitor the quality of care, and (6) effective linkages with rehabilitation providers to ensure 
that injured individuals return to a productive role in society.
23
 In order to ensure that state plans provide 
for "access to the highest possible quality of trauma care" Pub. L. 101-590 required states which received 
trauma system planning grants to develop or modify their plans to meet eleven criteria, which reflected 
the existing guidelines and standards established by the ACS and ACEP.
24
 
Organizational Barriers to Trauma System Development 
  All new federal programs must grapple with basic challenges of internal organization and 
establishing linkages with other organizations in their environment. In addition, federal policy makers 
must devise strategies to implement their goals effectively  through state and local agencies.
25
 
Responsibility for implementing Pub .L. 101-590 for the 1992 fiscal year fell to the Health Resources and 
Services Administration's Bureau of Health Resources Development (BHRD). BHRD officials 
immediately faced a difficult set of choices, for the initial appropriation for the program first year of 
operation ($4.3 million) was far short of its authorized level ($60 million) for FY1992. Furthermore, a 
careful inspection of both the statutory requirements of Pub. L. 101-590 and the BHRD's application 
guidelines suggests that Congress failed to learn from the past in designing the federal government's 
latest venture into health planning.  In particular, state trauma system planning programs would 
encounter substantial difficulties as a result of both the program's statutory requirements and 
questionable assumptions about the nature of the health planning process.  
 
 
 
 12 
 The BHRD's insistence that state applicants structure their goals and objectives to implement the 
goals outlined in its Model Trauma Care System Plan presented an additional challenge for state 
applicants. Pub. L. 101-590 required the BHRD to develop a model plan within a year, but a draft of the 
plan was not available prior to the first application cycle. Instead, applicants were asked to use the 
criteria presented in the National Transportation and Highway Safety Administration's (NHTSA) 
Assessment of Emergency Medical Services to assure a consistent format for evaluating applications.  
State plans were required to address eleven specific statutory functions, from establishing standards for 
trauma center designation to identifying resources for data collection, evaluation, and public education. 
The BHRD's emphasis on uniformity reflected its statutory mandate; the eleven criteria contained in the 
legislation were not goals, but rather requirements, for states which accepted federal funding to develop 
or modify trauma system plans.  
 A rigid adherence to the federal model trauma care system plan, however, ignores the 
considerable variation in both states' needs and priorities for trauma system development.  In some states, 
participants may regard prehospital communications and training as the most pressing problem, while 
others may emphasize data collection, the creation of standards for classifying and/or designating 
institutions as trauma centers, or other concerns.  By requiring states to simultaneously address a diverse 
set of complex issues with limited resources (the largest grants awarded in FY 1992 were below 
$300,000) Pub. L. 101-590 reflects a "top-down" approach to health planning.   
 Although Pub. L. 101-590 was designed as a capacity-building program for state governments, 
the matching funds requirements in the enabling legislation discouraged many states from applying for 
second and third year grants. Although no matching funds were required for a first year application, in 
the second year, states were required to match every federal dollar with two state dollars either in-cash or 
in-kind. The matching requirement was intended to extend the pool of funds available as widely as 
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possible by shifting much of the fiscal responsibility for the program to the states. Trauma system 
development was expected to be a long term process, and Congress expected the states to share in the 
cost. In practice, however, the matching requirement presented a significant hurdle for state health 
departments reeling from budget cuts and fiscal constraints. The required state contribution increased to 
three state dollars for every federal dollar in all subsequent years.  States which could not meet the 
matching requirements were ineligible to reapply for funding; x states did not reapply for second year 
grants.  
Deja Vu All Over Again: Facing Up to Political Reality 
 Trauma system development requires extensive cooperation among a wide range of organizations 
with different professional norms, economic interests, and values.  The BHRD's model trauma care 
system plan exhorts states to forge a consensus for improving the quality of care provided to injured 
patients among a diverse group of payers, providers, and consumers.
26
  While few organizations would 
oppose the desirability of the BHRD's long term goal of improving the quality of care for injured 
patients, agreeing on the means to achieve the goal, or even the definition of the most significant 
problems in a state's present trauma care delivery system is a different matter.  The BHRD's model 
trauma care system plan emphasized the importance of conducting a systematic needs assessment in 
order to assemble data to evaluate the performance of state trauma systems.  Implicit in the BHRD's 
model trauma plan, however, is the notion that hospitals, EMTs, third party insurers, rehabilitation 
providers, and others involved in the care of injured patients will set aside their self interest to cooperate 
for the benefit of patients. Data alone, however, is unlikely to foster cooperation among a diverse set of 
providers, for trauma system development, and health planning in general, presents policy makers with a 
contemporary example of the collective action problem. 
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 Regional trauma care systems are public goods which have the potential to impose significant 
costs on participating health providers. A trauma system, in other words, confers general benefits on its 
surrounding community by specifying operating standards, transfer protocols, mutual aid agreements, and 
other cooperative ventures to provide "optimal" care to injured patients. Individual providers, however, 
may bear the burden of a systematic approach--some hospitals and physicians may not be designated as 
trauma centers, and hence may treat fewer patients, while other hospitals which are designated as trauma 
centers may experience increased costs for staffing or a greater volume of uncompensated care for 
uninsured patients. While nonprofit hospitals often emphasize their service to the community, institutions 
which set aside their own self interest for the common good in the long run may go out of business 
altogether. Unless planners recognize the inherent barriers to consensus among participants in the 
planning process, they will be hard pressed to transform goals into actual policies.  
 In recent years, game theory has been used to explain a wide variety of phenomena, from 
international arms races to competition among hospitals for patients and physicians.
27
 The problem of 
cooperation is typically described in terms of a "game" between two parties known as the "prisoner's 
dilemma."  In the classic prisoner's dilemma, two prisoners suspected of having committed a crime are 
placed in separate cells by the police.  The police have enough evidence to convict each prisoner on a 
lesser charge, but nevertheless tell each man that he will be released if he denounces his companion.  If 
each prisoner implicates the other, both will be jailed, while if neither talks, each will receive a short 
sentence.  The usefulness of the prisoner's dilemma for analyzing cooperative behavior lies in the 
dominant strategy for both players--a rational player will choose to defect and implicate his companion, 
even though both will be worse off than if they cooperated and remained silent.  Since both players make 
their decisions independently without any knowledge of the other's choice, each assumes that the other 
will defect and acts accordingly.
28
  
 
 
 
 15 
The Politics of Designation 
 Trauma system development resembles a prisoner's dilemma in several ways.  First, institutions 
will weigh the costs and benefits of participating in a regional trauma system.  In theory, regionalization 
represents a rational solution to the problems of treating severely injured patients by directing trauma 
cases to designated facilities that are best equipped to care for them. However, it can be difficult to 
convince hospital administrators to participate in such a system. An assessment of state EMS and trauma 
care systems in the late 1980s concluded that only Maryland and Virginia had operational trauma care 
systems which met the criteria developed by the American College of Surgeons' Committee on Trauma.
29
 
In the absence of a solution to the problems of trauma center reimbursement, few providers are likely 
participate, for designation as a trauma center threatens to saddle institutions with an unprofitable mix of 
severely injured patients, many of whom lack insurance.  While hospitals which treat a small number of 
trauma patients may be happy to unload the responsibility of caring for their most expensive, unprofitable 
cases onto a regional trauma center, administrators at large teaching hospitals will strive to avoid having 
such patients "dumped" at their doorstep.  
 Other participants may also be reluctant to cooperate in trauma system planning. Outlying 
hospitals which are not designated as trauma centers may also be reticent to participate in a regionalized 
trauma care system for fear of losing patients or physicians. Although trauma patients are typically not a 
major sources of revenue for smaller community hospitals, administrators at non-designated institutions 
may fear that patients' perceptions of their institution will change if they no longer treat trauma patients.  
Furthermore, hospitals compete with neighboring institutions to attract and retain attending physicians on 
their medical staffs
30
 and the prospect of an exodus of physicians to institutions which treat a larger 
percentage of more challenging patients may make administrators hesitant to triage patients elsewhere.  
 
 
 
 16 
 Furthermore, institutions may be cautious about embracing a regionalized trauma system because 
of concerns about how many institutions will be designated and what standards will be used to verify 
hospitals' resources and capabilities.  Since not all institutions in a geographic area will be designated as 
trauma centers, many institutions are concerned about their role in a reformed system.  The cost of 
attaining and maintaining trauma center designation also constitute a significant barrier to building a 
consensus among providers, for the staffing and equipment requirements outlined by the ACS require a 
considerable financial commitment from participating institutions.  Hospitals which presently serve as de 
facto trauma centers, without having to meet ACS standards, may be required to add staff, expand shifts, 
or invest in new equipment or technologies in order to retain their designation.  Unless existing trauma 
centers are "grandfathered" or the standards for designation and/or verification are known in advance, 
many hospital administrators will be reluctant to participate in trauma system development.  Finally, 
enticing third party payers to support trauma system development will also be difficult, for effective 
treatment of trauma patients may involve two or more institutions.  Modifying existing reimbursement 
methodologies to compensate hospitals which stabilize injured patients for transfer to a trauma center, for 
example, poses a real challenge for case-based reimbursement systems such as Medicare's PPS, for 
insurers will not pay for the same treatment twice. In addition, recent trends in managed care (e.g., 
selective contracting with certain hospitals or integrated service delivery networks) will also affect third 
party payers' level of interest, and willingness, to finance trauma system development. Under such 
circumstances, how will hospitals share the reimbursement for treating a patient? While cooperation may 
be appealing from the perspective of providing "optimal care" to injured patients, the implementation of 
effective triage and transfer arrangements depends upon the creation of appropriate financial incentives 
for participating providers. 
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 Studies of cooperation over the past decade suggest at least two possible solutions to the 
collective action problem facing health planners. On the one hand, coercive government intervention 
through legislation or rule-making offers a means to overcome the collective action problem by forcing 
providers, payers, and others to modify their behavior.  Political theorists use a variation of this argument 
to account for the emergence of governments in the first place. In this view, the creation of coercive state 
power will assure the provision of collective goods, for government officials compel all to participate, 
even though all parties have an incentive to "free ride" by not pursuing joint action.
31
 
32
  Few providers, 
however, are likely to welcome new government regulations which either restrict the types of patients 
they can treat or which impose new staffing and equipment requirements on cash-strapped institutions.  
Furthermore, the BHRD's model trauma care system plan envisions cooperation, not unilateral 
government action, as the catalyst for trauma system development.  In light of the obstacles to 
cooperation among providers and payers noted above, however, how can planners transform conflict into 
cooperation and consensus? 
  Recent research on negotiation by Robert Axelrod and others emphasizes the importance of 
reciprocity and the creation of institutions or norms to ensure continued collaboration among the parties 
involved.
33
  In stark contrast to the coercive approach to solving the collective action problem outlined 
above, Axelrod used computer simulations to demonstrate that under certain conditions cooperation 
could emerge in "a world of egoists without centralized authority."  The conditions required for the 
emergence of cooperation are remarkably simple, yet intuitively appealing. The evolution of cooperation 
requires participants to interact on more than one occasion. If the parties expect to interact on a regular 
basis, reciprocity (e.g., tit for tat) offers the best strategy to improve cooperation among autonomous 
actors, for rational individuals (or firms) will base their actions upon the expected behavior of others.  If 
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other players consistently cooperate, rather than defect, cooperation can emerge as the dominant strategy 
for all participants.     
 Institution-building also offers a viable means to promote cooperation, particularly in cases 
where actors may be concerned about the possibility that others are cheating.  The establishment of a 
regime which specifies either formal rules or informal norms to govern the behavior of all participants 
institutionalize patterns of reciprocity. Such arrangements reassure participants because the "regime must 
specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of its 
own ability to spot others' cheating immediately."
34
  Reciprocity and institution-building are mutually 
reinforcing, rather than competing alternatives for promoting cooperation. Although participants may 
initially agree to cooperate on a limited basis on peripheral issues, the successful implementation of a "tit 
for tat" strategy can "spill over" to more significant issues over time.  
 How can the lessons learned from studies of cooperation be applied to trauma system planning? 
If key groups view trauma system planning as merely the latest in a series of well-intentioned, but 
abortive state and federal initiatives, they are unlikely to commit themselves to the process. How can 
state officials  encourage a diverse group of hospitals, prehospital providers, third party payers, and other 
stakeholders to participate in a collaborative planning process? Recent developments in the study of how 
individuals change their behavior offer insights into creating an effective "bottoms-up" approach to 
systemwide planning. 
A New Approach to Health Planning 
 As Douglas Cook, the Director of Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration, notes, 
"health care reform isn't something that can be imposed from the top down, from the state to the local 
level, or necessarily from the federal to the state and local level.  You need to accustom people to the 
notion that change will take place and that they will have to be a part of it."
35
  The first challenge 
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planners face in building consensus is enticing organizations to participate in the process.  As Cook 
notes, "the first essential element of restructuring the system is to gain political consensus that change 
needs to take place.  That means challenging the status quo in which there's a tremendous amount of 
money." Hospitals and other organizations involved in trauma system development, however, may differ 
in their willingness to embrace change.   
 In recent years, new views of how individuals change long standing behaviors highlights a 
critical, but often overlooked point for proponents of trauma systems development.  The development of 
regional trauma systems requires individuals and organizations to abandon long standing practices in the 
hope of improving patient care.  Enticing hospitals and other organizations to modify their behavior, 
however, is not as simple as presenting individuals with data that trauma systems can save lives, for 
decision makers are often resistant to change. Despite economists' assumptions to the contrary, hospitals 
are not monolithic and are rarely governed by single actors who can act unilaterally; in most institutions, 
power exists on many levels. Since the regulatory role of state health departments often places them in 
conflict with hospitals and other health providers, the very organizations and individuals whose 
cooperation is essential for the success of trauma system development are likely to view state-sponsored 
initiatives to regionalize services with caution. One strategy frequently used by participants in health 
planning processes is stalling--organizations send representatives who lack decision making authority to 
monitor the progress of the planning process, but never fully commit themselves to change. Health 
planners must recognize that individuals and institutions vary considerably in their willingness to change 
their behavior.  Trauma system development does not occur in a vacuum. Proponents of regionalized 
trauma care services must recognize that other factors in the political, economic, and organizational 
environment can and will change, and that such changes may have widespread repercussions for trauma 
system development.  
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 Prochaska and others have identified several basic stages and processes of change that 
individuals progress through as they seek to modify their behavior.
36
 Individuals progress through several 
preparatory stages before adopting a new mode of behavior. Persons who have given little or no thought 
to changing their behavior are at a "precontempletion" stage; in order to change such individuals' 
behavior, planners must first provide decisionmakers within affected organizations with information 
about the problem and its importance.  Other individuals have contemplated change, but have not yet 
decided to take action.  In contrast, other individuals are actively preparing for change by gathering 
information and exploring alternatives to their present behavior.  Some organizations may change their 
behavior without support or prodding from external actors; others need encouragement and support in 
order to reach a decision to change.  Since individuals' motivations to stay the course also vary, persons 
in different circumstances will require differing types and levels of support to maintain their new pattern 
of behavior.  
 
The Challenge of Effective Representation 
 The process of representation in most health planning programs presents an additional barrier to 
enticing individuals and organizations to conform to the goals outlined in a comprehensive state plan. 
Although committees and other formal planning bodies offer a forum for providers, payers, and 
consumers to express their views, the opinions of appointed members are at best an imperfect mirror of a 
state's trauma care constituency.  Representatives are unable to speak for groups who are not present at 
the advisory committee's meetings.  Merely including representatives from the hospital industry, for 
example, may introduce a hospital's views on trauma system development, but in no way does it insure 
adequate representation for the hospital industry in the planning process.  The limited size of the most 
planning boards means that some institutions will inevitably be left out; excluded groups may challenge 
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the legitimacy of the plan, or object to the composition of the membership which drafted it.  In short, it is 
not enough to merely invite a "representative" sample of organizations; rather, the process should be 
designed so that each group feels as if it is a stakeholder which has an opportunity to influence the final 
outcome.  
 For a statewide trauma system plan to have a reasonable chance at successful implementation, 
planners must assure that the representatives who participate in the process are authorized to speak for 
their institutions.  This notion is not as simple as it first appears, for most planning bodies are assembled 
by trying to model the demographic characteristics of the surrounding community.
37
  Participation in the 
planning process in no way implies a commitment by an organization to change its behavior.  Instead, the 
salience of the project can be gauged by organizations' choice of representatives--hospitals, for example, 
may send middle managers with no real decision making authority to simply "have someone at the table" 
to monitor the behavior of others and to express symbolic support for the goals of the process. 
Conversely, projects which are a priority for the institution will attract personnel from the upper layers of 
management, who have more authority to speak on behalf of their organizations.  While participants' final 
decision to commit themselves to the  goals outlined in a plan typically must be approved by others (e.g., 
the board of directors or other senior managers), high level participants have greater access to key 
decision makers in their organizations.  For planning to generate real long term results, it must 
incorporate key decision makers within organizations, rather than simply providing a seat at the 
bargaining table for interested participants. 
 This approach marks a departure from traditional approaches to health planning, which  have 
emphasized grassroots planning and broad based participation rather than forging consensus among key 
decision makers.  Community input remains an essential component of any successful health planning 
program, but plans must win the support of those organizations and individuals who will be called upon 
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to implement their recomendations.  Unless decision makers in positions of authority in affected 
organizations commit themselves to the planning process and endorse the final product, most plans are 
destined to collect dust. 
A new agenda for trauma system development 
 Although contemporary planning processes strive to acheive a "balance" between different 
groups represented on policy making boards and commissions, merely including a representative from 
the state hospital association or one of its member institutions often fails to meet the industry's concerns 
about representation, for other institutions may feel excluded from the planning process if they are not 
able to send a representative. Furthermore, "peak associations" at the state level (e.g., state hospital 
associations and medical societies) rarely possess the authority to bargain with representatives from other 
groups and government, in the U.S. such organizations typically lack binding authority to bargain on 
behalf of their members. As a result, effective representation in health planning debates must strike a 
balance between forging consensus among elites and ensuring grassroots feedback. Successful health 
planning programs must create an inclusive process which fosters a sense of ownership for participants.    
 Persons involved in regional planning must be able to influence the policy preferences of key 
decision makers within their organizations, rather than simply reporting on the activities of planning 
councils.  Planners must create a process which brings together leaders from stakeholder groups who 
understand the constraints and possibilities of their organizations' operating environment to air common 
concerns in order to identify points of agreement and discuss realistic strategies for implementing goals.  
Without a commitment from the leadership of affected organizations, trauma system planning efforts will 
fail.  Planning, unlike rule-making and regulation, must be a collaborative process, rather than one which 
relies on a "command and control" approach in which affected organizations are instructed to conform to 
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a model plan.  The outlines of a new strategy to reorient contemporary health planning incorporate 
lessons learned from studies of behavioral change and the evolution of cooperation.  
 Stakeholders in trauma system development may vary considerably in their willingness to modify 
longstanding patterns of behavior.  A planning process which requires all participants to commit 
resources or make decisions affecting their organizations by a preestablished deadline ignores the fact 
that some groups will be ready to change their organizational routines with little or no external prodding, 
while others do not yet recognize the need for change, or if they agree that change is necessary, believe 
that while others may need to change their behavior, they do not. In short, planners must work with each 
organization's "learning curve" in order to effect change in a voluntary planning process.  Recent 
experience with "negotiated investment strategies" and other forms of collaborative decision making 
offer an institutional mechanism to structure consensus-building efforts in health planning programs.
38
 
 Decision making using a negotiated investment strategy (NIS) was pioneered by the Kettering 
Foundation of Dayton, Ohio in response to growing dissatisfaction with existing methods of policy 
development and program implementation. Implementation of a NIS approach to trauma system planning 
would rely upon mediated negotiations among teams of leaders from different levels of government, 
health providers, payers, and other affected interests.  Similar strategies have been used successfully to 
resolve differences over the allocation of federal grant monies and program reductions in Connecticut 
during the 1980s. Under a NIS, the "end product" of the negotiations is a written agreement on how to 
resolve problems requiring joint action.  The NIS approach organizes various participants who do not 
have a history of cooperation into distinct negotiating teams, each of which addresses a single component 
of the overall problem.  As implemented in Connecticut, the NIS approach "envisions the building of 
consensus on broad policy issues in a two step process.  First, consensus is developed within teams made 
up of leaders representing organizations with similar, although by no means indentical, interests and 
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constituencies. Then, a consensus is negotiated among teams which ... have conflicting interests and 
constituencies and which have seldom or never entered into a similar negotiating situation."
39
 
 To build consensus among groups with different goals and interests, the NIS model relies upon 
the services of an impartial mediator to facilitate discussion and identify common ground among 
participants.  Although participants in an NIS have different economic and political interests, they share 
some things in common (e.g., providing high quality care to injured patients).  The mediator does not 
suggest solutions or impose decisions on participants, but rather encourages organizations to exchange 
information and present their concerns before any proposals or goals are drafted.  The end result of 
protracted, face-to-face negotiations among participants is a written agreement containing mutual 
assumptions, commitments, and expectations.  After other interested parties have had an opportunity to 
comment upon the proposed agreement, it is ratified by each of the participants, who also pledge to 
monitor the implementation of stated goals and review the performance of the programs or processes 
created by the agreement.   
 The NIS approach reflects Axelrod's notion of promoting collaboration by encouraging 
reciprocity; by defining each organization's interests and concerns, the NIS process aids participants in 
identifying common ground.  Implicit in the NIS approach is the notion of "spillover" effects. If 
organizations can identify possibilities for cooperation in areas which are peripheral, or at least not 
central, to their core activities, a pattern of tit for tat may emerge in which success in one area builds 
confidence among participants in the prospects for joint problem solving in other areas.  Furthermore, by 
emphasizing participating organizations' common interests and goals, a NIS approach minimizes the 
potential conflicts of interest among different groups.  Such a process, however, does not lend itself to 
quick solutions; negotiations are likely to be long, and change incremental.  The appeal of NIS, however, 
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lies in the incremental approach to consensus-building, for it ensures commitment from parties to the 
agreement. 
Conclusion 
 In the end, planners must create a new mechanism to forge agreement among a diverse group of 
prehospital providers, payers, and hospitals.  Such a mechanism must openly acknowledge conflicts of 
interest between parties, rather than seeking to create an artificial consensus.  An effective planning 
process must cope with concerns about the distribution of health care personnel and resources, overcome 
resistance from entrenched geographical interests, and replace traditional decision making processes with 
more "rational" approaches to caring for treating injured patients. The diffuse benefits of trauma system 
development efforts hinder planners' ability to mobilize support for new legislative initiatives or 
proposals which would impose new costs or obligations on health providers or payers. Although the 
model trauma care system plan and public health plans such as Healthy People 2000 offer detailed 
blueprints of state goals and options for achieving them, systemwide planning efforts neglect to consider 
the political feasibility of their policy recommendations.   
 Trauma system planning must promote collaborative problem-solving that is relatively immune 
to the uncertainties of competition for federal grant funds and the unpredictability of the state budget 
process, for an episodic approach to planning is both ineffective and counterproductive.  At best, bursts 
of activity followed by periods of inactivity due to budget shortfalls result in unnecessary delays in 
implementing programmatic objectives.  At worst, however, such a process alienates the very 
organizations whose participation is essential for improving the quality of care for injured persons.  
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